Main Page :- Report of the United Nations Mediator Galo Plaza to the Secretary-General (1965)


Table of Contents <-Previous 1 2 3 4 Next->


IV. Positions of the Parties Concerned and Efforts at Mediation

A. Initial Positions of the Parties and Efforts at Mediation

61. I regard it as important to a full understanding of the Cyprus problem in itself and of my own approach towards its solution to explain, firstly, where the parties stood at the beginning of the United Nations' efforts at mediation. for this purpose I have examined the documents, records and notes left by my predecessor, and whenever possible I have, in my own consultations with the parties concerned verified the positions described and the developments recorded. These are summarized in the following paragraphs.

(a) The Greek-Cypriot community

62. The attitude of the Greek-Cypriot community towards the future of Cyprus, as explained orally by many of its qualified representatives during the first phase of mediation and as formally stated on 13 May 1964 by Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic, started from the stand that the Republic was founded on agreements (those of Zurich and London) which did not emanate from the free will of the people but were imposed upon them. Archbishop Makarios stated that the only alternatives open to him were either to sign the agreements as they stood or to reject them entirely, and that in view of the grave situation which would have ensued upon their rejection he had felt obliged to sign them.

63. Further, the Constitution based on these agreements was put into force on 16 August 1960, and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were given constitutional force in it, without being approved either by the people of Cyprus directly or in constituent assembly by representatives duly elected for the purpose.

64. The Greek-Cypriot case cited the lesser numerical strength of the "Turkish minority", and its lesser ownership of land and contribution to public expenditure, as not justifying the Turkish community having been "put on the same level with regard to the exercise of political powers in the State with the Greek majority". It rejected the argument that the Turkish-Cypriots must be treated differently from other minorities in other countries because they formed part of the Turkish people of the nearby mainland and because their language, religion, customs and national aspirations were different from those of the Greeks of Cyprus.

65. The Greek-Cypriots maintained that besides the provisions based on the concept of "political communal segregation", the existing Constitution suffered from another fundamental defect in that its "Basic Articles" could not be amended. They considered that while such a provision might have political significance, it was of no legal value because the present constituent power had no right to restrict the constituent power of the future. Moreover, the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance constituted an unacceptable limitation of the independence of Cyprus, in that they allowed interference with its domestic affairs.

66. From these premises, the Greek-Cypriots argued that the whole concept on which the present Constitution is based was entirely wrong, and that "completely new foundations" must be laid. For this purpose they put forward certain general principles, while insisting--since popular approval of the Constitution was one of those principles- that the details must he formulated by a constituent assembly.

67. In summary, these principles envisaged Cyprus becoming "a completely independent, unitary, integral, sovereign State", unfettered by any treaties and with all powers emanating from the people, who would be entitled to decide the future of their country on the basis of "the internationally accepted principle of self-determination". The constitution should be founded on the principle that the political majority at any election should govern and the political minority constitute the opposition. Elections would be by general suffrage on a common roll; all legislative power would be exercised by a single-chamber elected parliament, to which the executive power would be answerable; and the judicial power would be vested in an independent, unified judiciary.

68. Human rights should be safeguarded for all persons and entrenched in the constitution. Some domestic judicial remedies would be established, as well as a right of individual appeal to the European Commission on Human Rights. All "communities and minorities" should have complete autonomy in religious matters and certain aspects of personal status, such as marriage and divorce, and in the administration of religious properties. In the realm of education and culture they should also be guaranteed certain rights, but the general responsibility for education should lie with the Government.

69. Most amendments to the constitution should require a two-thirds majority vote of the total membership of the parliament, followed by approval by an absolute majority (five-sixths majority in the case of communal rights) of the total membership after a new general election.

(b) The Turkish Cypriot community

70. The point of departure of the attitude of the representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community, as reiterated on many occasions during the firs phase of mediation, and as formally stated in a memorandum submitted by the Vice-President of the Republic, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, was that their greatest concern was the security of life and property of a people who were not a mere minority but a distinct community in their own right. From this view- point they did not object to the existing Constitution as such, but rather to the way in which it had been, in their opinion misapplied by the representatives of the Greek-Cypriot community.

71. They claimed that the recent events had proved that the various contractual and actual guarantees provided in the past were insufficient to meet the needs of their community for security. Additional and more effective guarantees must therefore be secured.

72. The additional guarantees, they maintained, could best be obtained by providing a geographical basis for the state of affairs created by the Zurich and London Agreements. In short, they wished to be physically separated from the Greek community. Their first inclination had been to seek this separation through the outright physical partitioning of Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek nations of which in their opinion the Turkish and Greek communities constituted an extension. However, "considering that this would not be willingly agreed to by Greek and Cypriot-Greeks", they modified this concept to that of creating a federal State over the physical separation of the two communities.

73. Their proposal envisaged a compulsory exchange of population in order to bring about a state of affairs in which each community would occupy a separate part of the island. The dividing line was in fact suggested: to run from the village of Yalia on the north-western coast through the towns of Nicosia in the centre, and Famagusta in the east. The zone lying north of this line was claimed by the Turkish-Cypriot community; it is said to have an area of about 1,084 square miles or 38 per cent of the total area of the Republic. An exchange of about 10,000 Greek families for about the same number of Turkish families was contemplated.

74. Each of the two separate communal areas would enjoy self-government in all matters falling outside federal affairs. Each could have cultural and economic relations directly with Greece or Turkey as the case might be. Each area could also enter into international agreements with Greece or Turkey as the case might be to regulate "relations of neighbourhood such as the provision of a certain special pass system" between that area and Greece or Turkey.

75. To the federal authorities would be reserved the subjects of foreign affairs, defence, the federal budget, customs; commerce, banking currency, standards of measurement, nationality, passport matters, post and telecommunications services and criminal legislation and jurisdiction. The federal legislature would consist a House of Representatives composed of 30 percent Turkish and 70 percent Greek community representatives, and a Senate divided equally between the two. The federal President and Vice-President would be elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively. The 30-70 ratio would be maintained for the Council of Ministers and the Public Service, and the 40-60 ratio for a small federal army and a police force for customs, traffic and tourist affairs.

76. Among other general principles reflecting those of the existing Constitution, the union of the Federal Republic with another State, or the partitioning of the island, would be prohibited under national and international undertakings. The provisions of the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee would continue to form an integral part of the Constitution.

(c) The other parties

77. Of the other parties whom the Mediator's terms of reference require him to consult, the Government of Greece gave my predecessor to understand that it considered the Zurich and London Agreements to have proved in practice to be unworkable. In its view at that time, the only possible and lasting solution was the application of the principles of international justice and of true democracy, with the full safeguarding of the right of the majority to rule and of the minority to criticize. In addition, on account of the special conditions of the case, and in order that there should be no fear of any possible abuse of the power of the majority, it would be possible to arrange that the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority should be safeguarded by the United Nations. The Greek Government stated further that full and untrammelled independence allowing the Cypriot people in free exercise of their sovereign rights to decide their future was the only solution.

78. The Government of Turkey, for its part, indicated that it considered a solution to the Cyprus problem to lie along the lines of a federal State, and it communicated to the Mediator an informal note containing general principles similar to those referred to above in regard to the position of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The present guarantees, including those against either union or partition, would be maintained.

79. The Government of the United Kingdom indicated to the Mediator its support for his endeavours to help to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem in accordance with his terms of reference, and its desire to support such a settlement.

(d) Incompatibility of the parties' views

80. Between the extreme and rigid positions held throughout that period by the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community on the one side and those of the Turkish-Cypriot community on the other concerning the future of their country, my predecessor observed that it was not possible for the two sides to find sufficient common ground to provide a basis for discussion. He noted that they chose to adhere to "solutions" that were wholly irreconcilable, because their points of departure were entirely different; and, at least under the prevailing circumstances, they chose not even to meet together to discuss their differences.

81. It is my understanding that from all the evidence at his disposal and from all the arguments adduced before him by either side, my predecessor came to the conclusion that the possible basis for an agreed solution lay neither in the federal regime suggested by one community nor in the system of what might be called "uninhibited democracy" suggested by the other, if for no other reason than that neither side was prepared to accept the other's views as a basis for discussion. In view of this impasse between the views of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders, whose positions were more or less supported by the Greek and Turkish Governments respectively, the previous Mediator's notes show that he felt it his duty to discuss with the parties other possible foundations for a settlement which might at the same time appear practicable, capable of producing common ground for negotiation, and consistent with the principles on which the Security Council, by its resolution of 4 March 1964, would wish to see a solution based.

82. A number of such possibilities had been raised in the past or were put forward in the course of the mediation activities. One group of them included various combinations of exchanges of territories and/or populations as between Cyprus, Greece and/or Turkey, designed solely to convert the population of Cyprus into one of virtually purely Greek ethnic origin. None of these ideas, however appeared either to have been put forward or to have been taken up seriously by any of the parties concerned; none of them appeared likely to command the support or meet the wishes of any large section of the Cyprus population; they all had compulsory movement of peoples, or at least their movement under duress. My predecessor therefore did not see in any of them a realistic basis for a solution.

83. There appeared at that time to remain only one other possible solution for which any claim could be made that, as some time in the recent history of Cyprus, it had been firstly, a well-recognized political objective; secondly, one which might have had a reasonable chance of securing the support of a majority of the people; and thirdly, one which might be capable of being implemented without a compulsory disruption of the present structure and distribution of the population. This was the conception of Enosis, or union with Greece, which had been the theme of the resistance against United Kingdom rule but which had also been--at least formally and in fact constitutionally--set aside by the agreements of 1959-60.

84. My predecessor observed--and from my own knowledge I can confirm--that there could be no concealing the fact that the formal "prohibition" of the Enosis idea did not suppress it in Cyprus. It continued to be discussed and advocated (as well as opposed), in and out of the institutions of government, long after the date of independence. It was and remains impossible to escape the impression that for a large body of the Greek-Cypriot leaders' following, and for many of the leaders themselves, the official demand for "full independence and self-determination" had no other meaning than this: that Cyprus should be released from the treaty and constitution obligations which limited her freedom of choice, whereupon she would opt by some acceptable democratic procedure for union with Greece, this union to take place by agreement exclusively between Cyprus and Greece.

85. The records of the previous Mediator show that the possibility of majority support for Enosis--together with the need to find a way of avoiding a situation in which it might have to be imposed on an unwilling Turkish-Cypriot minority--led to a search among a number of the parties concerned in the Cyprus problem for a formula of union between Cyprus and Greece which might prove acceptable to them all. My predecessor observed that such a formula would clearly need the agreement of all of them, for juridical as well as political reasons. In principle, it would need not only to satisfy the aspirations of a numerical majority of the population of Cyprus but also to avoid provoking the active resistance en bloc, or nearly so, of the Turkish-Cypriot community and assure them of the reasonable protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and it would need in addition to satisfy the legitimate interests of the other parties to the problem, namely the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

86. The search for such a formula was undertaken during the presence of my predecessor at Geneva from 5 July until he was stricken on 16 August and in the first instance mainly with the Governments of Greece and Turkey. I have been given to understand that these discussions sought to find an agreed formula for Enosis which would permit a Turkish national presence on the island, on either a sovereign or a leasehold basis, and at the same time provide satisfactory guarantees of the rights of those Turkish-Cypriots who would come under Greek rule.

87. With these efforts at an indecisive stage, my predecessor was preparing to embark on further direct discussions of his own with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey when he fell to the illness from which he never recovered. At the time of my appointment as Mediator, the search for a solution based on an agreed form of Enosis had failed for the time being at least. My first concern, as I have stated earlier, was to return the scene of mediation to the island of Cyprus.

B. Further Efforts at Mediation and Present Positions of the Parties

88. The formal positions of the parties concerned have remained essentially unchanged since I assumed the office of Mediator. During my first round of consultations, in September-October 1964, I found that, while the opposing sides maintained their basic demands, they seemed willing to make some concessions and adjustments in regard to the manner of implementation of these demands in order to facilitate a solution. But their positions had reverted to their original rigidity by the time of my second round of consultations in November and have remained largely frozen since then. As I indicated earlier, this hardening of attitudes was partly attributable to the expected approach of the debate of the General Assembly on Cyprus. But it was also due to other considerations, related to both internal and international politics.

89. During my successive consultations with the parties concerned, I constantly had in mind that the cause of mediation could best be served by bringing the parties together in direct discussion and negotiation. Moreover, while I considered it useful to establish lines of communications between some or all of the parties concerned at any levels, I always regarded as desirable the holding of talks between the two Cypriot communities as a first step leading eventually toward multilateral talks between all the parties concerned. I sounded the parties concerned on this subject and endeavored to impress upon them the desirability of holding such talks at the earliest possible moment. On the other hand I could not ignore the risk that hastily pre- pared meetings would give rise to futile and bitter wranglings instead of constructive discussions and might break up abruptly. Far from promoting the mediation efforts, such meetings would on the contrary lead to a further deepening of the present impasse. I therefore considered it necessary that before any meetings could be arranged a minimum common understanding would have to be reached among the participating parties. In the event, the positions of the parties concerned have remained too far apart for such an understanding to be achieved in any degree and none of them has been willing to meet the others except under conditions mutually unacceptable.

90. The detailed positions of the parties concerned regarding both the solution of the Cyprus problem and the more specific questions of direct negotiations are set forth in the following paragraphs.

(a) The Greek-Cypriot community

91. It may be pointed out at the outset that the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community are also the leading officials of the Cyprus Government, their most authoritative voice being that of Archbishop Makarios. Therefore, the position of the Greek Cypriot community identifies with that of the Cyprus Government. This position, remains essentially unchanged. The Greek-Cypriot Community continues to insist that any settlement must be founded on the unfettered independence of Cyprus, in the sense that the Republic must be freed from the limitations imposed in 1960, and on the right of self-determination, which they point out is an inevitable corollary of unfettered independence.

92. However, in order to facilitate a solution of the Cyprus problem, the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community are willing to make two concessions. Firstly, they agree that Cyprus, as long as it remains independent, should be made a demilitarized and non-aligned country. Secondly, although they consider the guarantees they have already agreed to provide for the protection of human and minority rights (see para 68) as fully adequate, they are prepared to take additional measures in this regard.

93. I discussed at some length with Archbishop Makarios and his associates the additional measures which the Cyprus Government should take to ensure the protection of human and minority rights. Taking into account the assurances they have already given regarding the protection of human and minority rights. Archbishop Makarios and his associates agree to the following guarantees:

- Provisions should be made in the constitution for the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms not less than those set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which Cyprus is a party, and in conformity with those set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The constitution should declare these rights and freedoms to be immediately applicable in the internal law of Cyprus. Under the Constitution propel the strictest respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons regardless of race, ethnical origin, language and religion should be guaranteed by appropriate judicial procedures permitting every aggrieved person to obtain redress by means of a simple and prompt action.

-  Each of the "minorities" should be permitted to continue to enjoy broad autonomy, to be guaranteed by the constitution and by legislation, in special matters of religion, education and personal status.

- Provisions should be made by the Government of Cyprus to prevent discrimination on account of race, ethnical origin or religion in the appointment and treatment of members of the Public Service.

- For the purpose of restoring confidence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the Government of Cyprus, as one of its first official acts after agreement was reached, should decree a general amnesty in respect of all crimes and offences related to the events beginning in December 1963, except for certain expressly defined crimes in common law.

- For a purely transitional period of defined duration and again for the purpose of helping to restore confidence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the Government of Cyprus should invite the United Nations to appoint a Commissioner who, assisted by a staff of observers and advisers, would observe on the spot the application of the foregoing provisions.

- The foregoing guarantees notwithstanding, each Turkish Cypriot should be entitled to decide freely whether he wishes to remain in Cyprus or to be resettled in Turkey. The Government of Cyprus should, in co-operation with the Government of Turkey and during an initial period of fixed duration, give adequate compensation and all other possible assistance to those who would opt for resettlement.

94. The demand of the Greek-Cypriot community for the right of self-determination requires certain clarifications. Its leaders have indicated that the exercise of the right of self-determination should be taken in the sense that, once fully independent, it will be for the Cypriot people alone to decide their political status and enter into relationships with any other State or States. It has usually been taken for granted that this will mean, in practical terms, a choice by the Cypriot people, by such means as a referendum, between continued independence and union with Greece, (Enosis) and past discussions have proceeded on that basis. But the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community have remained vague both as regards the timing of the proposed referendum and the form of Enosis. On the timing of the referendum. Archbishop Makarios has indicated that it is a decision for the people of Cyprus to take and that the proposed referendum could, for example, take place either immediately, or in a year, or in five years. On the form of Enosis, Archbishop Makarios has merely said that this would be decided by the Government of Cyprus in agreement with Greece before the Cypriot people are consulted on the subject. He has also left it to be understood that in the event that Enosis is chosen, any arrangements to be made after it has taken place would fall under the exclusive responsibility of Greece.

95. The question of the two British sovereign bases, which lie on the island of Cyprus but not within the boundaries of the Republic as constituted in 1960, has also been raised during my discussions with the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community, particularly in the context of the possible demilitarization of Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios holds the view that the British sovereign bases should be incorporated in the Republic of Cyprus as soon as possible. As a first step towards that end, he suggests that, for example, the status of the bases could be changed to that of a leasehold of a fixed duration. At the same time, he also points out that in the event of Enosis, the question of the future of the bases will become a matter to be raised by the Greek rather than the Cyprus Government.

96. As regards the question of direct negotiations Archbishop Makarios has expressed opposition to the holding of multilateral talks among all the parties for reasons both of principle and substance. He considers that the question of the future of Cyprus concerns only the Government and the people of Cyprus and therefore he is opposed to discussing this problem with any external governments. He takes the view that in any case nothing could result from such discussions, and that their failure would entail increased tension. On the other hand, he accepts in principle bilateral talks with qualified representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot "minority" and he has stated on several occasions his willingness to undertake these; but he has made it clear that the discussions should be limited to the question of their minority rights, that the principles of unitary State, majority rule, etc. were not negotiable and that any negotiations would end abruptly if the Turkish-Cypriots brought up proposals for partition or federation.

(b) The Turkish-Cypriot community

97. The Turkish-Cypriot community holds firmly to its previous position and in particular continues to insist on a solution based on the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government.

98. In a memorandum submitted to me on 22 February, 1965, Vice- President Kuchuk summed up the views expressed on many previous occasions by restating the reasons in support of the proposal for the geographical separation of the two communities. He claims a firm conviction on the par of the Turkish-Cypriot community that the Greek-Cypriot community and Greece will never genuinely give up their alleged ambition to bring about the annexation of Cyprus to Greece and their alleged desire to subjugate and destroy the Turkish-Cypriot community, either within the framework of an independent Cypriot State or through Enosis. Therefore, he maintains, any solution of the Cyprus problem must make it physically impossible to pursue these two objectives

99. Vice-President Kuchuk goes on to say that the Turkish-Cypriot community knows from bitter experience that "paper guarantees" in any form will be inadequate to prevent the Greeks from destroying or enslaving the Turkish-Cypriots and that some form of physical and geographical separation is essential to make it possible for the two communities to live and work together. The Turkish-Cypriots, he states, ask nothing more than their right to be free from threats as individuals and as a community and to be able to enjoy their basic human rights and to preserve their communal interests. He does not think it goes against the United Nations Charter to suggest that there should be a "voluntary exchange" (by which I understand him to mean an agreed exchange) of population under United Nations supervision. On the other hand, he believes that, it will go against the Charter to reject his proposal, because such rejection would amount to compelling the Turkish-Cypriots to live where they do not wish to live for personal security reasons.

100. The position of the Turkish-Cypriot community on the question of direct negotiations has been explained to me during my many meetings with their leaders and is restated in Vice-President Kuchuk's memorandum. The Turkish-Cypriot community favours multilateral talks among all the parties concerned to discuss the Cyprus problem. In his memorandum, Vice-President Kuchuk states that the Turkish-Cypriot community is convinced that the Cyprus problem should and can only be settled by peaceful means through negotiations among the interested parties, namely, the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities and the three Guarantor Powers, and that it has never refused to hold talks with those parties nor has it put forward any conditions before accepting to participate in them

101. As to the bilateral talks between the two communities, the Turkish-Cypriot leaders have indicated to me that they are willing to meet with the Greek-Cypriots to discuss the day-to-day administration of the island, but insist, in effect, that certain conditions should be met before such talks are held. As the first precondition they indicate that the constitutional order should be restored and the proposed talks take place in the institutions provided by the Constitution, such as the Council of Ministers. Another precondition is that the balance of power before the December 1963 events should be re-established by the removal of the armed forces created by the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots since then as, he states, the Turkish-Cypriots refuse to negotiate under duress. Enlarging upon this stand, Vice-President Kuchuk recalls in his memorandum that since March last he has repeatedly called upon the Greek-Cypriot leaders to meet with the Turkish-Cypriots as envisaged by the Constitution so as to ensure that pending the finding of an agreed political solution the rule of law and security of life prevail in the island. He states that the Greek-Cypriot leaders, by not responding to any of his appeals and by indicating instead that they would agree to meet the Turkish-Cypriots as representatives of a minority, are only trying to perpetrate a ruse aimed at imposing on the Turkish-Cypriots the present unlawful regime created by the Greek-Cypriots. While the Turkish-Cypriots are ready and willing to take part in any honest discussion of the problem, he continues, they cannot be expected to abandon their status and their rights before they sit at the conference table. Vice-President Kuchuk also indicates that the Turkish-Cypriots are opposed to bilateral talks with the Greek-Cypriots for the purpose of discussing a final settlement of the Cyprus problem as they consider that Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom cannot, in any way, be excluded from such discussions, and that it would be unfair to ask the beleaguered Turkish-Cypriot community to sit with the Greek-Cypriot leaders at a time when Cyprus has been placed under "the military occupation of Greece" with an armed force of 30,000 Greek-Cypriots and 15,000 Greeks.

(c) The Government of Greece

102. The Government of Greece continues to support the demand of the Greek-Cypriot community for the unfettered independence of Cyprus and the right of self-determination. The Greek Prime Minister and his colleagues have stated that the political future of Cyprus must be determined by the majority of Cypriots, expressing themselves in full freedom, and that Greece will respect their decision, whether they should choose continued independence or Enosis. Greece, they have added, will not obstruct the free choice by the Cypriot people, but neither will it accept that their right of self- determination should be hindered by anyone else, either through legalistic devices or through obstacles of any other nature. They have also stated that the Government of Greece places itself squarely behind the course of action pursued by the Cyprus Government.

103. With regard to the form of Enosis, the Government of Greece agrees with Archbishop Makarios that this question should be decided by the Cyprus Government in agreement with Greece before the people of Cyprus are consulted. It considers this as a "family affair" which should not lead to any difficulties.

104. In the event that Enosis should take place, having been freely chosen by the people of Cyprus, the Government of Greece has given the assurance that it would continue all the guarantees promised by the Cyprus Government for the full protection of human and minority rights, while it does not consider that Turkey has any legitimate claims on it, the Government of Greece has also expressed willingness, in the event of Enosis, to make certain concessions in favour of Turkey and to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Government to that effect if the latter so desires.

105. Regarding the question of direct negotiations, the Greek Government is in favour of bilateral talks between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots for the specific purpose of discussing the question of human and minority rights. It is opposed to multilateral talks among all the parties concerned under present circumstances, as such talks in its view would serve no useful purposes. However, the Greek Government would agree to participate in such talks if they were called for by the Security Council or any other competent organ of the United Nations and if a basis of understanding were found before the talks were held.

(d) The Government of Turkey

106. Let me say at the outset that the recent change of government in Turkey has not altered in the least its position regarding the Cyprus problem. The new Prime Minister, Mr. Suat Hayri Urguplu, has made it clear to me that the Cyprus problem is a national issue in Turkey and that the new Government will follow the same policy on it as its predecessor and with no less firmness. I have therefore based the following summary of the Turkish position on the view expressed to me by the two successive Governments which I consulted.

107. The Government of Turkey continues to insist that any settlement of the Cyprus problem must contain the following two elements: firstly, the prohibition of Enosis; and secondly, the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government.

108. The Turkish Government considers that the demand made by the Government of Cyprus, and supported by the Government of Greece, for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Cypriot people is only a device to bring about Enosis against the will of the Turkish-Cypriot community. It has made it clear that it will never agree to such a manoeuvre and that, if Enosis should be brought about despite its opposition, it will exercise its treaty right of intervention. Any settlement, the Government insists, should include the prohibition of Enosis, which could be stipulated and guaranteed by an agreement similar to that reached for Austria against any possibility of Anschluss.

109. The proposal of the Turkish Government for the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government remains essentially the same as the plan previously submitted by itself and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership (see paras 73-75). However, at one stage of the discussions the Turkish Government indicated that it was prepared to agree to a reduction in the area originally claimed for the Turkish-Cypriot community (about 1,084 square miles, according to the Turkish estimates, or about 38 per cent of the total area of the Republic) to about 750 square miles or about 20 per cent of the total area of the Republic. This would shorten the line of separation to a point on the north coast to the west of Kyrenia, from which it would run southwest to take in the Turkish sector of Nicosia and across to the east coast to and including the northern (Turkish) sector of Famagusta. The Turkish Government has also indicated that the transfer of the population which would be entailed by its proposal need not be effected precipitately. The transfer of Greek-Cypriots from the Turkish-Cypriot zone could be carried out progressively over a period of five to ten years, until the number of Greek-Cypriots in the area was reduced to less than 10 per cent of the total population. The movement of Turkish-Cypriots into the zone would not, in the Government's opinion, raise any difficulties.

110. During the first stage of my discussions with the Turkish Government, I gained from the then Prime Minister of the Turkish Government and his colleagues the impression that Turkey was open, in effect, to a solution which would, to a reasonable degree, satisfy the basic principles of protecting the well-being of the Turkish-Cypriot community and of ensuring the security of Turkey itself. In this connexion, I endeavored to ascertain from the representatives of the Turkish Government whether these principles would not be largely satisfied, firstly, by providing firm guarantees, constitutional and other, for the protection of human and minority rights within a unitary system of Government in Cyprus and, secondly, by Cyprus becoming a demilitarized and non-aligned country. The Turkish Government, however, continued to believe that only the geographical separation of the two communities could provide adequate protection for the Turkish-Cypriot community. With regard to the idea of Cyprus becoming a demilitarized and non-aligned country, the Turkish Government considered this to be a positive step but pointed out that it would be meaningless if Enosis were not effectively prohibited. The new Government reaffirmed the insistence of Turkey that any settlement firstly must maintain the equilibrium of territorial interests in the eastern Mediterranean and especially as between Turkey and Greece and therefore must not permit Cyprus to become Greek territory, and secondly, must ensure the security and well-being of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

111. The position of the Turkish Government regarding the question of direct negotiations between the parties concerned is based on the argument that the Cyprus problem is related directly to the territorial equilibrium in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular as between Greece and Turkey. It insists that the problem is not one that concerns, or can be solved by, the people of Cyprus alone, and that Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom have equal interests in the matter. Therefore, the Turkish Government strongly advocates the holding of five-party talks to discuss the solution of the Cyprus problem rather than bilateral talks between the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.

(e) The Government of the United Kingdom

112. The United Kingdom Government has taken and maintains the position that it does not wish to put forward any proposals or views of substance on the settlement of the Cyprus question as long as the efforts at mediation under the United Nations continue. Its representatives have indicated to me that they will do everything possible to facilitate the mediation efforts and will not stand in the way of any solution agreed upon by the other parties. At the same time, they do not contemplate that such a solution will not provide for the British bases on Cyprus to continue in existence, emphasizing the fact that the present sovereign base areas in any case fall outside the territory of the Republic.