Main Page :- Report of the United Nations Mediator Galo Plaza to the Secretary-General (1965)


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V. Observations on the Past and Future Course of Mediation

A. Introduction

113. I come now to the conclusions I have reached as the result of my endeavours so far, and I believe that from these conclusions there may flow some indications of the possible future course of the process of mediation envisaged by the Security Council.

114. Let me begin by staling briefly the present situation as I see it. More than fourteen months from the beginning of the present crisis, and twelve months after the Security Council decided that action by the United Nations as well as by the parties directly concerned should betaken to help bring the crisis to an end, the problem of Cyprus remains unsolved. The United Nations has helped to achieve the primary and vital objective of preventing recurrences of fighting. But the "peaceful solution and agreed settlement" aimed at by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964 -- a solution and settlement that must, as stated by the Council, be consistent with the Charter, with the well being of the people as a whole and with the preservation of international peace and security -- have yet to be achieved.

115. For want of such a solution, Cyprus continues to be the centre of a dispute which endangers both the safety of its own population and the relationships of the countries most directly concerned -Cyprus itself and Greece and Turkey-and therefore the peace of the eastern Mediterranean area and possibly the world as a whole.

116. The people of this young State are still living, as they have for more than a year, in an atmosphere of constant uncertainty, recurring tensions, and at the level at any rate of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leadership, continuing hostility and distrust, overshadowed by the danger or the hope, as the case may be, of possible intervention from the outside. They are still pointing guns at each other in a number of localities in the island. Barricades are still in position between the communities: in many places life looks "normal" behind the barricades, but everywhere it is fraught with fears of what may happen next. And for many thousands of Turkish-Cypriots displaced by force or fear from their farms, jobs and homes, life does not bear even the superficial appearances of normality.

117. The Government of the Republic, except for a part of the judicial system, is exclusively in the hands of the Greek-Cypriot majority community. And this community, through the Government, has at its disposal, both for the defence of the Republic and for the maintenance of internal authority, substantial armed forces. These forces are not purely Cypriot. They have been reinforced by military elements from Greece, as well as armaments and equipment from a variety of outside sources. With this power behind it, the Government exercises its authority everywhere in the Republic except in certain scattered areas and pockets containing probably between one third and one half of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The Government holds the limits of these areas by force, through armed police controls or manned fortifications or both. Inside these areas the Turkish-Cypriots -- similarly rein- forced from the outside, but on a much lesser scale, by soldiers, supplies and money from Turkey -- maintain their own police and military controls and such public services as they are able to provide. Within the limits of this kind of self-segregation, there is some movement in and out of these areas, more especially by Turkish-Cypriots, and electricity, water and limited telephone services, where they exist, are generally allowed to cross the lines.

118. In such a situation there is no apparent willingness -- and indeed in practical terms little ability -- on the part of the leaders of either community to offer any substantial concessions to an agreed political settlement. Each side rests its widely differing political ideas rigidly, and sometimes menacingly, on the amount of military force at its command. The forces immediately available, like the relative numerical strength of the two communities themselves, are greatly disparate, those of the Greek-Cypriots being much superior to those of the Turkish-Cypriots. But an uneasy equilibrium is maintained by two other factors: on the one hand the possibility (admitted on both sides) of further armed intervention by Turkey in accordance with the rights claimed from the Treaty of Guarantee, and on the other hand the presence and activity of the United Nations Force, as long as its function of helping to keep the peace has to be carried on without a political settlement in sight.

119. Externally, the continuing dispute has gravely embittered relations between the two other parties most directly concerned, namely, the Governments of Greece and Turkey. Each is deeply involved in it, historically as well as actually: there is no concealing the support which each is giving, nol only morally but also substantially, to one side and the other. During the crisis, moreover, each Government has felt obliged from time to time to place its mainland forces on the alert and take other precautionary measures. There is no doubt that the crisis has been costly to both Governments in more ways than one. I have been given to understand that, on the one hand, it interrupted and set back hopeful moves towards greater economic integration and closer relations of other kinds between Greece and Turkey; and that, on the other hand, the actual cost both of assistance to the communities in Cyprus and of defensive preparations at home since December 19 63 has diverted funds sorely needed for and not easily spared from economic and social development in both countries.

120. This whole state of affairs, both inside and outside Cyprus, has inevitably been far from conducive to the efforts at mediation. My task has been to try to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem. I underline the word "agreed". It has required me in the first place to try to find in the positions and aspirations of the parties concerned sufficient common elements to serve as a basis acceptable to all of them for a negotiated settlement. I have been obliged to look for this common ground with each of them separately, since, under the circumstances which I have described, none of the principal parties has been willing to meet the others except under conditions mutually unacceptable. During the course of my activities, I have been increasingly concerned to try to bring about as a first step towards wider consultations between the parties concerned, a meeting between representatives of the two Cyprus communities. I have emphasized to each of them the need to open some line of direct communication and to engage in a discussion of any aspect of the problem. I found the leadership of both sides agreeable in principle yet unable in practice to come together. This was because each made the acceptance of certain basic considerations a precondition of any such meeting. The Greek-Cypriot leadership has repeatedly stated to me, and up to very recent times has affirmed this in public, that it is prepared only to discuss with the other side the question of minority rights within the framework of a unitary state. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership, in turn, insisted through my last meeting with them that any discussion with the other side could only be within the context of a return to the 1960 Constitution and in the framework, in particular, of the mixed Council of Ministers established by that Constitution. The result has been that as long as such preconditions have kept them from meeting, the two sides have also been unwilling to modify significantly their separate conceptions of the methods by which the principles at issue should be applied.

121. In spite of this impasse, however, I do not feel entitled to suggest to you that the mediation effort has reached its absolute limits and that it has finally been proved to be incapable of bringing about an agreed settlement of the problem of Cyprus. I have considered very carefully the meaning to be attached to my terms of reference. Clearly, my first duty was, as I have said, to undertake consultations with each of the parties concerned in order to explore the possibility of their reaching agreement among themselves. I have done that, and it has led me to believe that, without a change in present circumstances, no such possibility exists. It has accordingly been suggested to me, by some of the parties concerned, that my next responsibility is to bring forward in this report my own proposals for those conditions of a settlement which, in my opinion, would allow the parties to go as close as circumstances permit to their legitimate objectives. But another of the parties has contended that any such proposals, especially since they would in a sense bear the stamp and accordingly the moral force of the United Nations, would tend to place me in the position of an arbitrator rather than a mediator and therefore to carry me beyond the limits of my terms of reference.

122. I do not necessarily accept that contention. In any event, however, I consider that there is an intermediate phase which does fall well within my terms of reference and which I believe capable of serving a useful purpose: namely, to bring forward now the results of my analysis of the positions of the respective parties, and to hope that, from the conclusions I have reached from this independent examination of their basic needs and aspirations, there will flow possibilities of bringing them together. I can see no other way of bringing about conditions under which the parties can agree to meet.

123. I believe--and I must emphasize that this is a matter of my own judgement--that the parties principally concerned have brought themselves to positions to which, for one reason or another, they feel publicly committed and which they cannot volunteer to modify. It is also my belief, and I hope that my analysis of their positions will show, that their respective conceptions of the principles at stake are not so different in terms of their real interests, as to be beyond reconciliation. If that is true, there must obviously be some hope for a reconciliation of the methods by which they seek to implement those principles and to protect those interests.

124. In giving the results of my analysis of the positions of the parties I therefore have a clear purpose in mind. It is to indicate, by implication and without any suggestion of seeking to impose upon the parties a course of action, some directions along which they should reasonably be expected to meet and try to seek an agreement. They need not be called upon to subscribe as a matter of course to the results of my assessment of their positions, for which I alone am responsible. But it may be, and I hope that this will be the case, that they will find in my examination of their fundamental attitudes and aspirations sufficient cause to allow the search for an agreed solution to enter upon a new and more fruitful phase. I can hardly emphasize too strongly the need to create, through mediation, the conditions under which the parties concerned can agree to meet for constructive discussions. If these efforts were now to come to an abrupt end, it would leave a dangerous and explosive situation. Mediation must go on, and I am gratified to be able to report that all of the parties wish it to do so; but to be fruitful it must now be aimed at providing the parties with a basis for coming together in direct discussions. The observations which follow are directed towards that end.

B. Some General Considerations

125. It would be useful at the outset, I think, to mention some general considerations to which one party or another attaches importance. The first of these is the relative standing of the parties in relation to the Cyprus problem. I have taken my terms of reference, as set forth in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, to identify the parties directly concerned in the Cyprus problem as those which the resolution enjoins me to consult: namely the communities of Cyprus (which I naturally assume to mean essentially the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities), the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

126. The Governments thus identified are those subscribing to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960, which were also referred to by the Security Council in the resolution already mentioned and which laid down, in effect, the conditions for the independence of Cyprus, including the very nature and political structure of the Republic. The "communities" are those which adhered to the Zurich and London Agreements that formed the basis of the Treaties. Accordingly, I must accept that the Security Council would expect me to regard the two communities and the four Governments as being parties with an equal interest, from the legal standpoint, in the settlement of the problem of Cyprus. It follows that an "agreed settlement" must be a settlement to which all of them can subscribe. On the other hand, the United Nations is dealing in this case with one of its Member States, by definition a sovereign and independent nation and for this as well as for other practical reasons I feel entitled to assume that a viable political solution must be sought in the first instance among the Cypriot people themselves and therefore, as matters stand, between the two main communities. I have proceeded, and will continue to proceed, on the understanding that no solution is feasible which does not meet with the acceptance of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. It is between those communities that peace, understanding and agreement must be found before there is any solution to the Cyprus problem; it is, at base, they who bear arms against each other; and it is they who must live under the terms of any settlement.

127. I therefore think it logical from the point of view of mediation that a settlement should be reached in two stages: the first between the two main communities of Cyprus, and the second by the other parties adhering to such a settlement. I would go further and say that, in the nature of things, such a procedure may prove essential in order to preclude any suggestion that a settlement is being imposed from the outside. This is a pragmatic approach, and I think necessarily so: it assumes that the other parties will find it in their own best interests to agree to a settlement arrived at among the parties within the Republic itself.

128. Secondly, I see a need to draw attention to the expression "community" and "communities", to explain the meaningsCfor they are at varianceCwhich the opposing sides attach to them, and to make clear the sense in which I myself generally refer to them in this report. For the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, as also for the Turkish Government, the two communities are distinct legal entities recognized as such by the Constitution of 1960 and differing in status only in so far as the provisions of the Constitution establish such differences. From their standpoint there is no such thing as a "majority community" or a "minority community" in Cyprus. It is fundamental to the Greek-Cypriots' argument, on the other hand, that the organization of the Republic should be based on the existence of a majority capable of governing and a minority entitled to the protection afforded by a normal democratic system. It is not of basic concern to their viewpoint that the present majority and the minority should happen to be identifiable by their ethnic origins. This difference of approach is obviously one that can only be resolved by a settlement of the Cyprus question as a whole, and not by any opinion which I could put forward. For my own purposes, and for no other reason than convenience, I use the words "community" and "communities" without any legal or political connotation and simply to identify the two ethnic groups.

129. Thirdly, I feel bound to refer to the question of the status of the Treaties and Constitution of 1960. For reasons on which I need not dwell, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and also the Turkish Government have attached particular importance to this question and have insisted on the validity of the Treaties and the Constitution, declaring that it is the fault of the other side that their implementation has been prevented. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriots and the Greek Government regard them as not being in effect because they are unworkable; and the Government of Cyprus, as I have recorded earlier, has gone so far as to declare formally that it considers the Treaty of Alliance to have been terminated, basing this position on the refusal of the Turkish Government to order its national contingent in Cyprus to return to its barracks. I do not myself feel called upon to make any judgement on these matters. At the same time, having taken it to be the clear intention of the Security Council that the "agreed settlement" of the Cyprus problem should be one agreed upon by the very parties which adhered to the Treaties of 1960, I think it logical to expect that the agreed settlement will not be one which merely restores the situation existing before 1963 and that, by agreeing to the settlement, the parties would necessarily agree also formally to abrogate or at least modify those Treaties. It is obvious that the Cyprus problem cannot any longer be solved by trying to implement fully the Nicosia Treaties and the Constitution governed by the Treaties. The succession of events, as well as the points of view held by the parties concerned, have left no doubt that the existence of the Treaties and the difficulties encountered in applying them constituted the origin of this crisis and have continued to influence its development. It is of no great importance to try to determine whether the Treaties were in fact incapable of being applied or whether their application was made impossible through the fault, deliberate or otherwise, of one or more of the parties concerned. It is enough to observe that the difficulties in implementing the Treaties began almost immediately after independence and became increasingly serious. The events which have taken place in Cyprus since December of 1963 have created a situation which makes it psychologically and politically impossible to return to the previous situation. Moreover, the very act of appointing a Mediator in order to help bring about "an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus" can be said to indicate the conviction of the Security Council that some new solution would have to be found in order to bring an end to the existing crisis.

C. Analysis of the Parties' Positions

130. It will be understood that my own view of the positions taken by the parties to the Cyprus dispute must necessarily be governed by certain criteria. Foremost among these are those which emerge explicitly or implicitly from the Security Council's resolution of 4 March 1964. Others are impose( by the actual circumstances of Cyprus, and I have felt bound to take these into account to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the resolution o the Security Council. According to these criteria, I have concluded that any settlement of the problem must take account of the following considerations:

- it must recognize, as the Security Council did by recommending the appointment of a Mediator, that the problem of Cyprus cannot be re solved by attempting to restore the situation which existed before December 1963, but that a new solution must be found;

- it must, in order to become an "agreed settlement", be capable of se curing the support of all the interested parties identified by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964: namely, the Governments o Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and the representatives of the Cyprus communities;

- it must be consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of which the following in particular seem relevant; the purposes principles and obligations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, recognition of the sovereign equality of the Member States, abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and respect for treaty obligations not in conflict with those of the Member States under the Charter;

- it must be in the interest of the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole, and to this effect it must be capable of satisfying the wishes of the majority of the population and at the same time of providing for the adequate protection of the legitimate rights of all of the people;

- it should also, in order truly to serve the interests of international peace and security and the well-being of the people of Cyprus, be a settlement capable of lasting.

131. I have examined the positions of the parties with all these considerations in mind. I find it convenient to group my observations under three main headings: (a) independence, self-determination and international peace; (b) the structure of the State; and (c) the protection of individual and minority rights.

a) Independence, self-determination and international peace

132. The Republic of Cyprus is a sovereign, independent State: it was admitted as such into the membership of the United Nations, it continues to be a Member State, and the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 refers to it explicitly as "the Sovereign Republic of Cyprus".

133. But the burden of the complaint of the Greek-Cypriot leadership and the basis of their political claims -- in which they have the support of the Government of Greece -- is that the independence and sovereignty of the Republic, and therefore its "sovereign equality" with the other Members of the United Nations and its "right of self-determination", were impaired by the Treaties of 16 August 1960 which formed an integral part and governed the nature of the Constitution of the same date. The effect of these Treaties was indisputably to forbid the people of Cyprus from amending their own Constitution, or at any rate the basic articles which determined the structure of the State; to prohibit the union of Cyprus with any other State; and to forbid the partitioning of the country. The Greek-Cypriot leadership claims to have accepted these restrictions under duress, in that the only alternative at the time would have been to suffer an attempt to partition the country. The political objective of the Greek-Cypriots has therefore been to secure for Cyprus an "unfettered independence" which would allow the population freely to determine its own future according to the principle of majority rule and minority protection (including some special transitional measures) and to have the right to set aside the treaty restrictions on both the internal institutions of the State and its external relationship.

134. For their part, the Turkish-Cypriot leaders and the Government of Turkey do not dispute the restrictive nature of the conditions under which Cyprus acceded to independence. From their standpoint, however, these limitations were deliberate and essential: to secure for the Turkish-Cypriots their treatment not as a minority but as a community with distinct political rights, and to secure for Turkey the maintenance of an equilibrium in the eastern Mediterranean which, in the Turkish Government's view, would be specially seriously disturbed should Cyprus become Greek territory. These two basic purposes complement each other, and help to explain the solidarity of the attitude of the Turkish-Cypriots and the successive Turkish Governments towards the settlement of the problem. They contend that any acceptable alternative to the 1960 settlement must serve exactly the same purposes. For them, therefore, any formula envisaging Cyprus continuing as an independent State must contain a guarantee against union with Greece and iron-clad protection of the safety and rights of the Turkish-Cypriots as a community: hence their proposal for the geographical separation of the two Cyprus communities under a federal government bound by treaty obligations against union with any other country and also -- as their own quid pro quo -- against the partitioning of Cyprus. Likewise, they contend that any "right of self-determination" accorded as an equal but separate right to the Turkish-Cypriot community; if the Greek-Cypriots chose to exercise it in favour of union with Greece, the Turkish-Cypriots would be free to exercise it in favour of union with Turkey, insisting therefore on the partitioning of the country.

135. Different though these approaches may be it is still possible to read into the positions of the two sides an objective which, so long as it is stated in very broad terms, would seem acceptable to them both: namely, an independent Cyprus with adequate safeguards for the safety and the rights of all its people. I have found it useful, in my own examination of their positions, to trace the paths back from that apparent common objective to determine where and why they diverge, and to consider the alternative routes that appear open.

136. If the independence of Cyprus is to be considered as the first and most important basic principle on which the parties could agree, it will be necessary for all the parties to understand and agree on what it means in the context of the circumstances of Cyprus. And it is here that the most difficult aspect of the whole problem arises. The Greek-Cypriots have coupled their aspiration for "unfettered independence" with the demand for the right of self-determination. Many of them have not concealed their hope and belief and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership has not concealed its suspicion and fear -- that the purpose and result of the exercise of this right would be to realize the long-cherished aspiration for union (Enosis) with Greece. These hopes on the one hand, and fears on the other, have been encouraged by the knowledge that the necessary consent of the Greek Government would be forthcoming. As far as the positions of the other parties are concerned, there has been a tendency by the Greek-Cypriots to disregard them on the assumption that "unfettered independence" and the removal of the treaty limitations would already have been achieved, leaving self-determination in this sense a matter between Cyprus and Greece exclusively.

137. I am certain in my own mind that the question of Enosis is the most divisive and potentially the most explosive aspect of the Cyprus problem. I have been assured by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and by the successive Governments of Turkey that any attempt to bring it about against their will would provoke active and vigorous resistance. And I judge this to be true, short of a change in attitudes which only a long passage of time could bring about. I feel bound, therefore, to examine this question with the greatest care.

138. The question of Enosis itself has several aspects. If its imposition in present circumstances would be judged from the Turkish side as tantamount to an attempt at annexation to be resisted by force, it is also a question which, to the best of my understanding, does not enjoy unqualified support among the Greek-Cypriots as a whole. It is true that among them, as among many people in Greece, the word and the thought of Enosis have a highly emotional quality: it serves to some as a symbol of Pan-Hellenistic ideals, to others as the battle-cry of the resistance against colonial rule, and in the worst times of the present crisis it seemed like a banner under which the Greek-Cypriot community as a whole found their rallying-point. But as a practical step in the political evolution of Cyprus it has struck me, in discussions with a wide range of Greek-Cypriot opinion, as having a much less united and imperative driving force behind it.

139. This may be in part because there have been few precise indications of the form which Enosis should take and of the economic, social and political consequences which would flow from it. I understand Enosis to mean in its literal sense the complete absorption of Cyprus into Greece, but I would hesitate to say that this is what every Greek-Cypriot favouring it intends it to mean.

140. The Greek-Cypriot leaders in the Government of Cyprus -- maintaining the position that Enosis would be a matter purely for Cyprus and Greece to decide -- could tell me nothing about the form in which they envisaged it taking place except that this would be determined by the Cyprus Government in agreement with Greece before the Cypriot people were consulted on the subject. I had sought clarification of this question not only because of the existing Turkish opposition to the idea but also because I had no doubt that the implementation of Enosis, even should it be accepted as an element of the settlement of the Cyprus problem, would entail many complex problems, political, economic, financial and other. For example, Cyprus and Greece have now different bases for their systems of law and administration of justice; Cyprus, which produces essentially the same sorts of agricultural commodities as Greece, now exports most of its products to the United Kingdom under conditions of commonwealth preferences; it has a higher standard of living and a higher wage level, a different tax structure and a more comprehensive social security system; it also has a different currency system and, being a member of the sterling bloc, its pound is maintained on a parity with the pound sterling and under present arrangements is freely convertible into any other sterling bloc currency and relatively freely convertible for dollars.

141. All such matters would require adequate adjustment should Enosis be brought about. Their effects would vary widely depending upon whether Enosis would take the form of a complete union with Greece, in the sense that Cyprus would become one or more provinces of Greece, or whether Cyprus would be given some privileged status within the Kingdom of Greece. In either case, a number of complex problems would arise and require urgent solutions and it seemed to me indispensable that the Cypriot people should be fully informed of them if they were to be called upon to make their choice. To the best of my knowledge, there is no common understanding on either the Greek-Cypriot or the Turkish-Cypriot side, nor between the Cyprus and Greek Governments, of what form Enosis would take and what its effects and implications would be.

142. I have stated the foregoing as matters of fact and of impression. I do not wish it to appear that I have any opinion on the merits or otherwise of Enosis. Moreover, I must also make it clear that neither the President nor the Government of Cyprus, in their discussions with me as the Mediator, actually advocated Enosis as the final solution of the Cyprus problem. Archbishop Makarios and members of the Government acknowledged that Enosis had been the original aim of the uprising against British rule and that it remained a strong aspiration among the Greek-Cypriot community. They went so far as to express the opinion that if the choice between independence and Enosis were to be put to the people there would probably be a majority in favour of the latter. Some of the Ministers and other high officials of the Government have openly advocated it in public statements; but for the Government as a whole the formal objective is limited to unfettered independence, including the right of self-determination. I understood this position, of course, not to preclude the possibility of Enosis, which would obviously be implied in the right of the people of Cyprus, once "fully independent", to choose whatever future course they wished.

143. It is far from me, in any event, to dispute the principle that the people of an independent country possess the right to determine their own future, including their relationship with any other State. This right follows naturally from the fact of sovereign independence. If Cyprus should become "fully independent" by being freed from the 1960 treaty limitations, it would automatically acquire at the same time the right of self-determination; and if it were an independent State based on democratic principles, it would be entitled to insist that the right should be exercised by the people as a whole, acting directly by such means as a referendum or indirectly through their Government.

144. This brings me to what I regard as the most crucial aspect of the question of Enosis, What are the considerations by which a modern sovereign State exercises its right of self-determination? I suggest that just as the enjoyment by the citizen of his fundamental rights is not an absolute matter but is governed by consideration for the rights and legitimate interests of his fellow-citizens, so also is the exercise by the State of its right of self-determination governed by its obligations as a State. These obligations relate both to the well-being of all its citizens and especially in the case of a State which has undertaken the solemn commitments laid down in the United Nations Charter, they relate also to the cause of international peace and security.

145. I believe that the Government of Cyprus which has professed its desire for a peaceful solution to its country's problem, can be expected to follow this general rule. I am confident that in informing, influencing and responding to public opinion on the future status of the country, the Government will recognize that it has a most serious duty to satisfy itself that all of its obligations are being met, towards both the well-being of its own citizens and the peace and security of the region which it shares with other nations. It will wish to be satisfied that any action which it may take, in the name of the right of self-determination, will help to heal rather than aggravate the dissensions among its own people, and to serve rather than jeopardize international peace and security.

146. I must state here in all frankness how I myself see the Enosis question in the light of the above considerations. My observations of the situation in Cyprus over a period of many months, my discussions with many of its citizens, and my consultations with representatives of all the parties concerned have made it difficult for me to see how any proposed settlement which leaves open the possibility of Enosis being brought about against the will of the Turkish-Cypriot minority can secure agreement at present or in the foreseeable future. Serious warnings have been given that an attempt to impose such a solution would be likely to precipitate not only a new out- break of violence on Cyprus itself but also a grave deterioration in relations between Turkey on the one hand and Cyprus and Greece on the other, possibly provoking actual hostilities and in any case jeopardizing the peace of the eastern Mediterranean region. The question can be raised, consequently, whether it would not be an act of enlightened statesmanship -- as well as a sovereign act of self-determination in the highest sense -- if the Government of Cyprus were in the superior interests of the security of the State and the peace of the region to undertake to maintain the independence of the Republic. This would imply, of course, a decision on the part of the Government to refrain, for as long as the same risks persisted, from placing before the population the opportunity to opt for Enosis. Should the Government of Cyprus undertake such a course of action, I am confident that the Government of Greece, in the same spirit, would be prepared to respect it. I must emphasize again that in view of the sovereign prerogatives which the Cyprus Government would enjoy, this decision would naturally take the form of a voluntary act on its part. To maintain the independence of Cyprus would have to be a free undertaking on the part of the Government and people of Cyprus and not a condition to be imposed upon them. It would remain open to the Government, if it wished the population as a whole to share directly in this exercise of the right of self-determination, to seek through some such means as a referendum its approval of the proposed terms of settlement including the undertaking to maintain the independence of Cyprus. I should like to emphasize here my view that the whole of any proposed settlement based on continued independence, and not the question of independence alone, should in that case be put to the people. My reasons for this will become obvious from the rest of my report. At this point, I need only add that I am convinced that the present leaders would be in a strong position to explain such proposals to the people and to gain the understanding and acceptance of the majority. It would also be open to the Government, if it wished to use this further means of encouraging the whole population to vote freely, to invite the United Nations to observe the referendum.

147. Assuming a course of action such as I have described, the common objective would now be considerably more precise: a "fully independent" state which would undertake to remain independent and to refrain from any action leading to union with any other State. I should regard this clarification as not only satisfying the principle of self-determination but also as going a long way towards meeting another essential requirement of a settlement: namely, that it should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. I should mention here another useful action in that direction which the Government of Cyprus has already indicated its willingness to take. The President, Archbishop Makarios, has declared his readiness to bring about the demilitarization of Cyprus, as a contribution to the peace and security of the region. He has reacted favourably to the idea that international assistance, through the United Nations, should be invited for this task. Moreover, he has indicated his desire to see Cyprus refrain from aligning itself with any grouping of nations for military purposes. For its part, the Government of Turkey indicated to me when I first raised this question with it last November, that the demilitarization of an independent Cyprus, but only if effectively carried out, and only within the context of a settlement which guaranteed the independence of Cyprus, would serve the interest of Turkey's considerations of security.

148. The suggested demilitarization of Cyprus has inevitably raised the question of the future of the two British sovereign base areas. The position of the United Kingdom Government is that, since those areas lie outside the territory of the Republic, they do not form part of the present dispute, I am encouraged to believe, however, that this question could, if it were to become a vital aspect of the settlement as a whole, be constructively discussed among the parties to the Treaty of Establishment by which the base areas were reserved from the territory of the Republic.

(b) The structure of the state

149. The next important point of divergence between the parties concerns the structure of the independent State. On the one hand, the Greek-Cypriot leadership insists upon a unitary form of government based on the principle of majority rule with protection for the minority. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots envisage a federal system within which there would exist autonomous Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot States, the conditions for whose existence would be created by the geographical separation, which they insistently demand of the two communities.

150. It is essential to be clear what this proposal implies. To refer to it simply as "federation" is to oversimplify the matter. What is involved is not merely to establish a federal form of government but also to secure the geographical separation of the two communities. The establishment of a federal regime requires a territorial basis, and this basis does not exist. In an earlier part of this report, I explained the island-wide intermingling in normal times of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot populations. The events since December 1963 have not basically altered this characteristic; even the enclaves where numbers of Turkish-Cypriots concentrated following the troubles, are widely scattered over the island, while thousands of other Turkish-Cypriots have remained in mixed villages.

151. The reason why the Turkish-Cypriot leadership seeks a geographical separation, which does not now exist, of the two communities should, also be understood. If the fear of Enosis being imposed upon them is the major obstacle to a settlement as seen from the Turkish-Cypriot side, one reason for it is their purported dread of Greek rule. Their leaders claim also, however, that even within the context of an independent Cypriot State, events have proved that the two communities, intermingled as they are now, cannot live peacefully together. They would meet this problem by the drastic means of shifting parts of both communities in order to create two distinct geographical regions, one predominantly of Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants and the other of Greek-Cypriots. They claim that this would now be merely an extension of the process that has been forced on them by events: the greater concentration than usual of their people in certain parts of the island, notably around Nicosia and in the north-west.

152. But the opposition of the Greek-Cypriots to this idea of geographical separation is hardly less strong than the opposition of the Turkish-Cypriots to the imposition of Enosis, and I have felt bound to examine the proposal with as much care as in the case of Enosis. Much has been written and argued on both sides in Cyprus about the economic and social feasibility (or lack of it) of bringing about through the movement of the populations concerned the only possible basis for a federal state. I have studied these arguments and I find it difficult to see how the practical objections to the proposal can be overcome.

153. In the first place, the separation of the communities is utterly unacceptable to the majority community of Cyprus and on present indications could not be imposed except by force. The opposition to it is in part political: Greek-Cypriots see in the proposal a first step towards the partitioning of the island, although this is vigorously denied by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as well as by the Turkish Government. But to my mind the objections raised also on economic, social and moral grounds are in themselves serious obstacles to the proposition. It would seem to require a compulsory movement of the people concerned -- many thousands on both sides -- contrary to all the enlightened principles of the present time, including those set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, this would be a compulsory movement of a kind that would seem likely to impose severe hard ships on the families involved as it would be impossible for all of them, or perhaps even the majority of them, to obtain an exchange of land or occupation suited to their needs or experience; it would entail also an economic and social disruption which could be such as to render neither part of the country viable. Such a state of affairs would constitute a lasting if not permanent, cause of discontent and unrest.

154. Moreover, the proposed federated States would be separated by an artificial line cutting through interdependent parts of homogeneous areas including, according to the Turkish-Cypriot proposals, the cities of Nicosia and Famagusta. Would not such a line of division inevitably create many administrative difficulties and constitute a constant cause of friction between two mutually suspicious populations? In fact, the arguments for the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government have not convinced me that it would not inevitably lead to partition and thus risk creating a new national frontier between Greece and Turkey, a frontier of a highly provocative nature, through highly volatile peoples who would not hesitate to allow their local differences to risk involving the two home countries in conflict and consequently endangering international peace and security.

155. Again, if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the State, and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction. I am reluctant to believe, as the Turkish-Cypriot leadership claims, in the "impossibility" of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots learning to live together again in peace. In those parts of the country where movement controls have been relaxed and tensions reduced, they are already proving other- wise.

156. It is essential, I think, to reconsider the objective intended to be served by the geographical separation of the two communities and to look for other ways to achieve that objective. I am inclined to regard separation not as, in itself, a basic principle in the proposals of the Turkish Government and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, but rather as the only means which they consider workable of ensuring respect for the real principle at stake: namely, that the Turkish-Cypriot community must be protected and protected adequately. I fully support that principle. I feel strongly that the protection of the Turkish-Cypriot community is one of the most important aspects of the Cyprus problem and that everything possible must be done to ensure it, including safeguards of an exceptional kind. But I would think it essential for the Turkish Government and the Turkish-Cypriot, leadership to reconsider their contention that nothing short of the geographical separation of the two communities can ensure adequate protection.

157. I have found agreement on all sides that there must be practicable and effective safeguards for the security and the rights of all the citizens of Cyprus, as well as the legitimate rights of the Turkish-Cypriots as a community. To be practicable, it is difficult to see how they can take the drastic form of geographical separation of the communities. To be effective, as well as practicable, they could conceivably include certain special measures of a different kind, as discussed below.

(c) The protection of individual and minority rights

158. One of the principles of the Charter which I regard as having the highest relevance to any settlement of the Cyprus problem is that of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, without discrimination. The fact that the population of the island continues to consist of two principal ethnic communities, the further fact that they are unequal in numbers and finally the gravity of the conflict which has developed between them -- all these elements have given and must continue to give rise to serious difficulties in applying, this principle, and must be made the subject of special attention.

159. From the moment a settlement is in sight, the Charter's insistence on respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, will assume a capital importance in Cyprus. It will be an indispensable condition for the progressive re birth of confidence and the re-establishment of social peace. The obstacle against the full application of the principle cannot be over-estimated; an they are no less psychological than political. The violent sharpening of "national" sentiments over the months of crisis will for some time make it extremely difficult for officials at all levels to impose or even exercise strict impartiality towards all the citizens of the country, and without that impartiality and understanding there will be a constant risk acts of discrimination, even if laws are respected in the formal sense. Furthermore, there are personal hatreds which will last beyond any political settlement. Again, not all of the too many weapons which are in too many hands are likely to be surrendered readily. These factors will, for a period whose duration can only be guessed at, create problems of personal security on a serious scale.

160. For all these reasons there is no doubt in my mind -- and on this point all parties are in agreement -- that there must be established in Cyprus the most rigorous possible guarantees of human rights and safeguards against discrimination. For some time, in order to help the two communities to find their way out of the vicious circle of deep distrust between them, I am convinced, indeed, that certain international guarantees must be provided.

161. It is hardly necessary for me to say that while the safeguards would apply to all the people of both communities, in practice it is the Turkish-Cypriot minority which will stand most in need to them. The safeguards are justified not only by the need to re-establish a durable peace in the life of the island, nor only by the need to ensure that the settlement accords with the Charter of the United Nations. Simple equity also demands that these safe-guards should be provided. It will need not to be forgotten that the Turkish- Cypriot community obtained from the Zurich and London Agreements a series of rights greatly superior to those which can realistically be contemplated for it in the future. In addition, it would be just and fair to recognize that however effective the safeguards that can be devised any Turkish-Cypriot who fails to find in them a basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of things, would have the right to resettle in Turkey, and should be assisted to do so, with adequate compensation and help in starting a new life. Appropriate assistance should also be provided, without discrimination, to rehabilitate all those whose property has been destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of the disorders. This will be a task of reconstruction for which, I am confident, external assistance, including that of the United Nations family of organizations, would be forthcoming at the Government's request.

162. I must point out also that the fact that the population of Cyprus consists, even without geographical separation, of two main communities gives rise to another special problem in regard to the application of the United Nations principles of human rights. Each of the two communities is profoundly attached to the "national" traditions which were bequeathed to it by history, and each has always enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in what it has regarded as the essential fields of religion, education and personal status. In the light of widespread modem conceptions of the need for the integration and assimilation of differing peoples in the interests of national unity, it may be a matter for regret that little was done under any of the previous regimes, ancient or recent, to bridge the separateness of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Recent events have, however, made these distinctions more rather than less acute, and to try to eliminate them now by drastic measures could only mean taking a distinctly backward step in the field of the protection of human rights as far as the minority community particularly is concerned. Since independence the Greek-Cypriot community -- being in the majority not only in terms of numbers but also in the governing institutions of the State -- has been in a position to deal freely with its own affairs of religion, education and personal status within the framework of the State: should it have the same powers in respect of the Turkish-Cypriot community, the latter would feel itself deprived of some of the most fundamental of human rights.

163. I have shown earlier in this report that the 1960 Constitution went to unusual lengths in trying to meet this situation by conferring on the Turkish-Cypriot community, as such, a number of political rights designed to allow it to protect itself from being completely subjugated by the majority community. It is, however, this feature of the constitutional system which has been most severely criticized and which has given rise to the most serious difficulties of implementation. It seems impossible to obtain agreement on maintaining such a constitutional oddity in the future against the will of the majority. Yet the problem behind it cannot be ignored, and that problem -- the hard fact of the distinctive character of the two communities, sharpened by the recent events -- requires that some special measures should be applied in order to ensure to the members of the minority community a proper voice in their traditionally communal affairs and also without weakening the unity of the State, an equitable part in the public life of the country as a whole. Such measures will be a necessary condition for any settlement that must take account, as the Security Council's resolution requires, of the "well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole". They need only be transitional: indeed they should be clearly understood by all sides to be so; but they seem to me in fact the only practical way to ensure in the longer run, the political unity of the country. Failure to provide a transitional means of ensuring a share by the Turkish-Cypriot community in the political life of the State could only, I am convinced, have the opposite effect from accelerating their integration. It would only perpetuate their separateness -- because it is in the general nature of things that the larger community tends to dominate and that the smaller to be dominated; and it is in the present nature of things in Cyprus that this could prolong the ferment of hostility between them and the risk of endless acts of violence. I cannot emphasize this matter too strongly. It is not a question of denying the right of a political majority to rule, but a question of the need to avoid the excessive dominance of one presently distinct community over another, to an extent and in manner likely to delay indefinitely the unity of the population.

164. I have therefore been pleased to be able to record the assurances which Archbishop Makarios has given of his concern for these aspects of the problem and the specific measures which he has expressed his willingness to apply. As regards individual rights, these measures include, on the one hand, a number of permanent provisions: the incorporation in the Constitution of human rights and fundamental freedoms conforming with those set forth in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights adopted by the United Nations; judicial procedures for their application, and vigilance to ensure equal treatment in appointments and promotions in the public services. They include, on the other hand, certain exceptional and transitional provisions; of foremost importance among these, in my opinion, an invitation to the United Nations to appoint a commissioner, with a staff of observers and advisers, to be present in Cyprus for as long as necessary; and also the granting of a general amnesty and provision for the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriots who wished to leave the island and for the rehabilitation of those who would remain. The need for such measures having been conceded in principle, I feel confident that their improvement and extension are, if need be, matters susceptible of negotiation between the parties. I attach particular importance to the presence and role of a United Nations commissioner, a unique and extraordinary safeguard whose very existence would, I believe, engender confidence in all Cypriots.

165. In regard to the second aspect -- the matter of the position of the Turkish-Cypriots as a community -- I have been pleased also to find some measure of sympathetic understanding in the attitude of the President. He has already offered them a continuation of their previous autonomy in certain fields of religion, education and personal status. Moreover, he conceded to me the desirability of finding some means, for a transitional period at least, of ensuring representation of the Turkish-Cypriots in the governmental institutions. This might be done by a system of proportional representation or reservation of seats in the parliament, and also, perhaps by the appointment of a Turkish-Cypriot Minister responsible for the affairs of his community -without prejudice, of course, to other Turkish-Cypriots being elected or appointed on merit. In this field, too I am therefore confident that negotiations between the parties could be fruitful. Another question that will need to be examined and agreed between them is that of the official languages of the State, for use in the administration, the courts and other institutions. It may be that besides Greek and Turkish it will be necessary to give English the transitional status of an official language to serve as a bridge between the other two. The control and staffing of the police force is another matter for careful and sympathetic study. So also is the possibility that municipal and other forms of local government could be so organized as to give the greatest possible measure of local autonomy so that in areas where one community or the other predominates, it would feel that it is playing an effective and equitable part in the management of local affairs.

D. The Question of Guarantees

166. In any progress made towards a settlement the question of the means of guaranteeing its provisions will inevitably arise. It, would, of course, be open to the parties to embody the terms of the settlement in treaty arrangements; but my impression is that, for very different reasons, both sides to the dispute would approach such a course with misgivings.

167. On the one hand, the conception of treaty arrangements which would affect the internal affairs of the Republic is anathema to many Greek- Cypriots. It conjures up the restrictions and impositions which they claim to have suffered by reason of the Treaties of 1960. Even if -- and this is essential -- the terms of the new settlement are in every respect freely and consciously agreed to by the people of Cyprus, it is conceivable that the old stigma would remain. On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots feel also that they have had a painful experience in placing excessive faith in treaties, having seen many of their treaty rights forcibly suspended and the Guarantor Powers fail to act in the crisis as the Turkish-Cypriots expected them to.

168. It may be that a different form of guarantee will have to be devised. In this regard I see an opportunity for the United Nations, to play an invaluable role, if it so agreed. The possibility could be explored, I believe, of the United Nations itself acting as the guarantor of the terms of the settlement. It might prove feasible, for example, for the parties to agree to lay before the United Nations the precise terms of the settlement and ask it not only to take note of them but also to spell them out in a resolution, formally accept them as the agreed basis of the settlement, and request that any complaint of violation or difficulty in implementation be brought immediately before it. Such a role for the United Nations would, I believe, be in full accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

E. Concluding Remarks

169. For the reasons stated at the beginning of this chapter I have not felt it appropriate at this stage to set forth precise recommendations or even suggestions of a formal kind for a solution to the problem of Cyprus. I have tried instead, by analysing the positions of the parties and defining their objectives as I see them, to make apparent certain directions which they themselves should explore in the search for a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement. I have done so because it became clear to me that the purpose of mediation could not be further served by my continuing to hold separate consultations with the parties under the existing circumstances.

170. If I have any formal recommendation to make, it is that the parties concerned should try, in the light of the observations I have made in this report, to see their way clear to meet together -- with or without my presence, according to their wishes -- at a suitable place on the earliest possible occasion. In my view the procedure most likely to produce fruitful results would be for such a meeting or series of meetings to take place in the first instance between representatives of the two principal parties who belong to Cyprus: the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. I have explained earlier (see paras. 126 and 127) my reasons for holding this view. However, my suggestion by no means precludes other alternatives that may prove acceptablewhether initial meetings between all of the parties concerned, or a series of meetings, consecutive or even simultaneous, at different levels and among different groups of the parties. Moreover if, as I believe, the most useful beginning can be made at the level of the Cyprus communities, this does not alter the fact that, as I have stated earlier, an "agreed settlement" in the context of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 must have the adherence of all the parties mentioned in the resolution. Any agreement arrived at between the Cyprus communities would therefore require endorsement by the other parties concerned.

171. I do not suggest a formal agenda for these meetings, nor do I expect that at present it would be feasible for the parties concerned to provide one. They may be agreeable, in the first instance, simply to take the observations in my present report as the basis for an exchange of views -all the more so should they agree to accept the report, as I intend it, as a document for which I alone am responsible.

172. Should this procedure lead the way eventually to an agreement on all major issues at the leadership and governmental level, and should it then be found necessary to refer the terms of settlement to the people of Cyprus directly, I consider that it would be essential to put to the people the basic settlement as a whole. They should be asked to accept or reject it as a single package, and not in its various parts. This is because any settlement which might be arrived at will necessarily be in the nature of a compromise involving concessions to be made by both sides from their original positions. It seems to me inevitable that it will have to be a carefully balanced series of agreements, each relying on the other and all of them on the whole. It will also be accepted, I believe, that should there be a majority vote against the terms of the settlement, this should not by construed as a vote in favour of any other particular solution. Instead, it would only signify that the process of seeking an acceptable form of settlement would have to begin anew.

173. I reiterate and emphasize my conviction that every endeavour must continue to be made to bring about a peaceful solution and agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem. By any and all appropriate means, the search must go on, with patience, tolerance and good faith. The well-being of the Cypriot people demands it; so does the cause of international peace and security.