Cyprus-Dispute.org

Main Page :- The "Kutchuk/Denktash Plan", 14 September 1963

 

A cursory glance at the general policy of the Turkish Community as regards the future of the Republic on the occasion of the completion of three years since the establishment of the Republic

Three years have now elapsed since the establishment of the Cyprus Republic. By the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements, which are the foundation of the Constitution, while the Turkish Community abandoned its basic aim of being united with its motherland and agreed to the establishment of this Republic, the Greek Cypriots also in their turn gave up their basic aim of Enosis and agreed to become partners with the Turks in the Administration of the Republic. It was agreed that the Republic to be set up under the Zurich agreements would be of a peculiar character (sui generis) and it was accepted from the first days that the viability of this Republic is based on the good-willed and understanding cooperation between the two communities which constitute this Republic by showing loyalty to the promises made and to the agreements undertaken.

Unfortunately from the first days the Greeks have indicated that they had not signed these agreements in good-will and attacked the Zurich Agreements through the press and other media. Even Makarios, who personally signed the Zurich Agreements did not refrain from admitting on the occasion of the EOKA anniversary on 1 April 1960 (when the Constitution had not yet cone into force officially), that the Zurich Agreement was a spring-board for future victories.

Since the proclamation of the Republic the Turkish Community has made it known in various ways that the Greek Cypriots had no intention to accept and implement with sincerity and integrity these Agreements and they have made statements, published articles and prepared reports showing that in the application of these Agreements they have resorted to every trick to render inoperative the articles which recognise even the most insignificant rights to the Turks.

It has become explicit beyond doubt that at present the Greek Cypriots have no intention at all to set up the separate Municipalities and the Cyprus army, that they will never implement the requirement of the employment of Turkish civil servants comprising of 30% and that they will not take into account the Turks' existing right of say through veto concerning such vital aspects for the Turkish Cypriot Community as foreign policy, defence and domestic security. The most serious aspect of the issue for the Turkish Community is that the Greek Cypriots have started disputing even the guarantee agreement which is the sole basis for the implementation of the Constitution and the fact that Makarios without even feeling the necessity to get the views of the Turkish Community in this regard has assumed the status of head of state and has had the insolence and boldness in stating that they will not recognise the guarantee agreement. For this reason for us it is superfluous to explain in this report the injustices, pressures, threats and blackmail made by the Greek Cypriots in this deceitful manner against the Turks since the Constitution went into force. (We already have prepared reports on this score).

The real aim of this report is to formulate the counter policy to be followed by the Turkish Community in the face of the de facto situation created by the Greek Cypriot side through a systematic policy.

Undoubtedly in dwelling upon the principles of any policy to be followed it is necessary to indicate the real objectives of such a policy. Up until now the basis of the policy conducted by the Turkish Community was based on the necessity of the full implementation of the Constitution of the Republic. This policy was catering to the needs of the Turkish Community as long as the Greek Cypriots insistently evaded the de facto implementation of the Constitution, however this policy has become very ineffective in the face of the Greek Cypriot policy to completely amend or to abolish the Constitution.

In our opinion in particular after Makarios' statement to the effect that 'the year 1964 will be a decisive year for the amendment of the Constitution', the Turkish Community faces the necessity of following a more active policy. What should the basic target of such active policy be? The answer to this question must be given separately depending on each of two possible alternatives the Greek Cypriots may follow:

1. The Greeks may finally abrogate or try to annul the Zurich and London Agreements and the Constitution.

2. They may continue with their 3 year old policy of the de-facto 'amendments' by not allowing the implementation of the Constitution and to de-facto reduce the Turks into a minority by enlarging the compass of the Constitution.

In the event of the Greeks officially abrogating the constitution or trying to amend it, in our view there is only one thing the Turkish Community will do; take its destinies in its own hands and establish a Cyprus Republic outside the Zurich Agreements in accordance with the axiom 'when the obstacle is removed one reverts to the forbidden.' The success of such a move will necessitate a very hard struggle on the part of the Turkish Community and conditioned on many internal and external factors. No doubt the most important of the external factors will be the material and moral help of the motherland. Practically there is no possibility of the Turkish Community being able to fight under the present conditions without obtaining in advance the consent and subsequent support of the motherland. Therefore, it is essential that we should agree in advance with our motherland on the line of action based absolutely on a detailed plan. Makarios has not yet made a serious effort to abrogate or amend the Agreements. There is ample time to prepare such a plan and we must make the most of it.

As a matter of fact under the Treaty of Guarantee the motherland can intervene alone if the Constitution is abolished officially. But the only result of this intervention would be to return to the legal status established under the Zurich Agreements. As the Greeks are determined despite the intervention not to allow this legal status to survive, and, taking into consideration the negative effect which intervention would create at UNO and amongst world opinion, it is a matter of dispute whether it would be worthwhile taking the risks which will be created for the motherland from a unilateral intervention. Therefore, in the event of the Greeks abolishing the Constitution officially, the Turkish Community, taking its destinies in its own hands, should go ahead with the establishment of a Turkish Republic and so, if nothing else, the dangers from an actual intervention would, at the beginning, be averted.

We can sum up the main points of such a plan as follows:

1. The Turkish Vice-President of the Republic will be accepted as President of the Republic by the Turkish Community, and a Government consisting entirely of Turks will be set up in accordance with the provisions of the existing Constitution.

2. Our motherland will recognise immediately the government to be formed which will ask our motherland for help.

3. The intervention of the motherland will follow the request for this help and if need be Turkish Republic rights will be recognised to the Turkish Cypriots settled in Turkey (in principle this right exists under the present Constitution in the form of quota), they will be given passports prepared in the name of the Turkish Republic and thus their infiltration into Cyprus will be secured.

4. The Turkish members of the House of Representatives and the Turkish members of the Communal Chamber will form the House of the Republic and proclaim the provisions of the existing Constitution for the establishment of a Republic composed entirely of Turks or as another alternative a provisional constitution should be drawn up and proclaimed.

5. After recognition by the motherland the Turkish Republic will immediately sign with the motherland trade agreements as a result of which the Turkish Community will meet its material requirements in the ensuing conditions. No doubt the object of such an agreement will be to give legality to the help from the point of view of international law.

6. There is no doubt that this move of the Turkish community will meet with Greek Cypriot opposition and counter moves and probably the Greeks will undertake de facto aggression against the Turks.

As a result of these aggressive acts of theirs a struggle will start between the two Communities and this struggle will decide the outcome.

7. When the struggle begins, the Turkish Community, interspersed throughout the island, will forcibly concentrate in an area and will be compelled to defend it. The selection of the area will depend on the strategic plan which will be prepared by experts. Before the struggle starts it will be necessary to prepare detailed plans to increase the (military) mobility of the Turkish Community and concerning the equipment, stocks and the shipment of supplies and reinforcements from the motherland.

8. Detailed projects should be prepared from now and the necessary financial plans should be made and the necessary nucleus must be set up from now within the Turkish Communal Assembly so that the civil servants existing in the present administrative mechanism could continue their work uninterrupted from the very first days of their transfer to the new administration.

The above is an outline of the plan, and before a complete and detailed plan is prepared in respect of all fields it will be necessary and advisable to reach a definite and final decision concerning the basic idea. We are sure that the Turkish Community will make every possible sacrifice in this question.

Now as regards the policy to be followed in the face of the Greek Cypriots' maintaining the present situation, that is the continuation of the de facto amendment of the Constitution: In our view if the Greeks continue this policy the target of the Turkish Community should again be the establishment of a separate Republic. The Turkish Community can no longer tolerate continuation of this state of affairs. However since the Constitution will not be openly violated by the Turkish Community, the Turkish Community is again obliged to advance to the final goal at a slower tempo. For this reason the following plan comes to mind in response to the second possibility.

1. The plan which is designed to be implemented in respect of the first option should be prepared as soon as possible.

2. A violent pressure movement should be initiated in every field in order to force the Greek Cypriots to implement the Constitution. The most natural result of such an action will be that the members of the Turkish civil service in general will have to oppose the Greek Cypriots during the course of their duties basing their actions on the Constitution. As a result it will be inevitable to appoint such elements in the Turkish Communal Assembly in accordance with the 8th article of the first plan.

3. From the economic point of view, in order to render the Turkish Community self-supporting and to ensure the success of the first plan we must establish useful industries. As these industries will be boycotted by the Greek Cypriots, we will secure markets in Turkey to enable these enterprises to survive.

4. With a view to invigorating the Turkish Community financially and making preparations for the implementation of the first plan, it is necessary that speedy and frequent links should be established between Cyprus and the motherland particularly by sea (ferry-boat, etc) and that the population of the Turks in the Island should be increased to the maximum through the entry of people from Turkey as tourists.

5. The Turkish Community, after it has completely prepared itself financially, militarily and morally should put its first plan into operation by taking advantage in the event that the Greek Cypriots create a Constitutional crisis.

Until now the Greek Cypriots have given us many opportunities on this matter and from now on it is obvious that they will provide more opportunities on account of their behaviour.

Nicosia, 14.9.1963

(Dr. Fazil Kuchuk)
Vice President of the Republic

(Rauf Denktash)
President of the Turkish
Communal Chamber

 


www.cyprus-dispute.org